


ELECTORAL CORRUPTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA:

SOCIAL PROFILES, GENDER DISPARITIES AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	4
METHODOLOGY	6
JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND PROCEDURAL VULNERABILITIES IN ELECTORAL CORRUPTION CASES.....	11
SOCIAL DISPARITIES IN THE SANCTIONING OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES	14
1.1 ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCE REPORTS	15
1.2 COURT ANALYSIS: CONTESTATIONS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCE CASES.....	19
SOCIAL DISPARITIES IN CRIMINAL SANCTIONS	27
2.1 ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL CASES	27
2.2 RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS.....	31
RECOMMENDATIONS	34
ANNEX 1. RESULTS OF ECONOMETRIC REGRESSIONS	43
ABOUT THE CENTRE PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT	45

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ACRONYMS

ADJAJ – Agency for Digitalisation in Justice and Judicial Administration

ANOFM – National Agency for Employment

BNS – National Bureau of Statistics

CC – Code on Administrative Offences

CEC – Central Electoral Commission

CEPEJ – European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice

ECHR – European Court of Human Rights

CJEU – Court of Justice of the European Union

CNAS – National Office of Social Insurance

CNCD – National Council for Combating Discrimination

CNA – National Anti-Corruption Centre

CP – Criminal Code

CPP – Criminal Procedure Code

CPD – Centre Partnership for Development

CSM – Superior Council of Magistracy

IDNP – State Identification Number (IDNP)

IGP – General Inspectorate of Police

INSP – National Inspectorate of Public Security

MAI – Ministry of Internal Affairs

NEET – Not in Education, Employment or Training (young people who are not in education, employment or training)

ODIHR – Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)

NGO – non-governmental organisation

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OSCE/ODIHR – Election observation missions by the OSCE and ODIHR

PIGD – Case Management Integrated Programme

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UTAG – Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia

EU – European Union

UN – United Nations

EC – European Commission

IAJ – Agency for Digitalisation in Justice

INTRODUCTION

Corruption has emerged as one of the most significant barriers to achieving sustainable development worldwide. The United Nations¹ estimates that corruption diverts more than \$2.6 trillion annually, representing around 5% of global GDP, with over \$1 trillion paid in bribes. These misappropriated resources undermine trust in government, weaken democratic institutions, slow economic growth, and deepen global inequality and poverty. Within this context, electoral corruption represents a particularly harmful manifestation of the broader phenomenon: it distorts political competition and erodes the democratic legitimacy of free elections. Scholarly international literature² emphasizes that *vote buying* is among the most prevalent forms of electoral corruption. According to International IDEA, *vote buying* refers to *"the offering of financial or material incentives to voters by candidates or parties during the campaign period and/or on election day in exchange for electoral support"*. Even though more than 90% of countries explicitly prohibit this practice, while 91.7% had a legal ban in place as of 2020, the phenomenon persists due to limited administrative capacity, insufficient political will to enforce the law, and the politicization of oversight mechanisms. Through vote buying schemes, political actors can mobilize or suppress specific voter groups, sustain networks of dependent relationships, and compromise the integrity of elections and the quality of democratic governance. Recent research even hypothesizes that susceptibility to electoral bribery may differ by gender; however, the absence of disaggregated data makes these claims difficult to confirm, underscoring the need for detailed, gender-sensitive national analyses.

Over the recent years, discussions on electoral corruption in the Republic of Moldova have significantly intensified, driven by strained elections and an avalanche of cases documented by the authorities. This phenomenon, which is manifested through vote buying and the use of informal networks to influence election outcomes, has prompted the Parliament to take legislative action. As a response, Law No. 230/2024³ introduced Article 47¹ into the Code on Administrative Offences⁴, sanctioning the solicitation, acceptance, or receipt of benefits by voters in connection with exercising their electoral rights, while preserving the exception for campaign materials financed from the electoral fund. The sanctioning regime established fines ranging from 500 to 750 conventional units and included a special exemption for self-reporting and cooperation. However, its expeditious adoption right at the beginning of the electoral period has sparked criticism regarding proportionality and transparency. Initially, application of the administrative offence rule involved a functional division: the IGP documented and drafted administrative offence reports, while the CNA has been examining cases and imposing sanctions. Due to limited operational capacity and a high volume of cases, in March 2025 the competence on enforcing Article 47¹ was transferred to MAI (INSP), which accelerated the speed for sanctioning and in a short time boosted the revenues from fines; however, debates on procedural guarantees and uniformity of practice were not excluded and these issues were also identified in the process of reviewing court decisions. In criminal law, Article 181¹ of the Criminal Code⁵ remained the primary instrument for sanctioning active voter corruption

¹ <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/governance/what-are-costs-corruption>

² <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/vote-buying.pdf>

³ https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=144559&lang=ro

⁴ Article 47¹. Passive electoral corruption

(1) The solicitation, acceptance or receipt, personally or through an intermediary, by a voter of goods, services, privileges or advantages in any form, to which he is not entitled, for himself or for another person, or the acceptance of a promise or offer thereof, for the purpose of exercising or not exercising electoral rights in elections, including regional elections, if the act does not constitute a criminal offence, shall be punished with a fine of 500 to 750 conventional units.

(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this article shall not apply to the goods indicated in Article 181¹ paragraph (3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova No. 985/2002.

(3) A person who has committed the act referred to in paragraph (1) shall be exempt from administrative liability if they have self-reported and/or actively contributed to the discovery or prevention of the act of electoral corruption.

https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=151425&lang=ro#

⁵ Article 181¹. Corruption of voters

(1) Offering or giving money, goods, services or other benefits for the purpose of inducing a voter to exercise or not to exercise their electoral rights in parliamentary, presidential or local elections or in a referendum

shall be punished by a fine of 550 to 850 conventional units or imprisonment of one to five years, and the legal entity shall be punished with a fine of 4,000 to 6,000 conventional units with the deprivation of the right to carry out a certain activity or with the liquidation of the legal entity.

(2) The category of goods referred to in paragraph (1) also includes alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and food products.

(offering or giving benefits), with penalties tightened in 2025 and the scope expanded to include promises as a typical method, alongside aggravated sanctions when such acts serve the interests of a criminal group. Overall, this legislative evolution reflects a dual structure where the administrative offence targets the passive conduct of the voter, while criminal law addresses active conduct by offerors - both trending toward stricter and broader liability, amid legitimate concerns about proportionality and the quality of the legislative process.

The pyramidal structure, combined with the digitization of processes, has fragmented the corruption phenomenon, which became much more sporadic and diffuse as compared to its traditional forms.

Official public data⁶ and the findings following monitoring procedures indicate that, in the 2024 electoral cycle voter corruption has gone beyond the classic, sporadic and localized pattern ("money for votes"), evolving into an integrated mechanism consisting of hierarchically organized networks. The OSCE/ODIHR mission⁷ reported instances of vote-buying schemes and other related practices amid foreign interference, despite generally adequate technical administration during voting days, thus signalling pressure on equal opportunities in the electoral competition. At the top of the pyramid were central coordination structures (including some based outside the country), supported by an executive core within the Republic of Moldova, having in subordination a well-established territorial network comprising 119 regional cells averaging 2–3 per rayon, and over 1,900 primary cells, with each rayon targeting approximately 1,500 individuals. The network's backbone consisted of around 33,000 activists who received periodic payments that significantly increased close to the beginning of the electoral period; each activist was tasked with recruiting and registering 5–10 potential voters, thus creating though a multiplier effect, critical masses ranging from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of individuals susceptible to influence, with an ensured extensive territorial coverage. The operation relied on a digital registration and monitoring system via a Telegram chatbot, through which members and activists recorded individuals in the application and transmitted copies of identity documents used to open bank accounts abroad in the absence of the account holders. Based on the information from CAN and IGP, the Constitutional Court (in its Decision No. 25 of 28 November 2024⁸) noted opening of 29 criminal cases against 74 persons for voter corruption/illegal financing, enforcement of seizures in the amount of 4,509,011.60 lei, and receiving of 3,165 administrative offence reports under Article 47¹ of the Code on Administrative Offences, with 188 sanctioning decisions totalling approximately 7.1 million lei, as well as evidence of the collection of personal data of approximately 140,000 voters and the use of a banking application from the Russian Federation for payments estimated at approximately USD 39 million; The Court has qualified the scale of violations as "unprecedented", drew attention to the impermissible involvement of representatives of religious denominations during the campaign, and called for improvements to the legal mechanisms for prevention/combating, reaffirming that secret and freely expressed voting is the foundation of democratic elections. Concurrently, the Court concluded that no violations capable of influencing the outcome had been confirmed by final decisions or acts of the competent authorities; therefore, it upheld the election results and validated the mandate.

This report aims to provide a rigorous analytical framework on electoral corruption, focusing on gender specificities and the mechanisms favouring this practice. The absence of studies on the vulnerabilities of different social groups to voter corruption, coupled with the rapid evolution of the phenomenon in recent years, calls for an integrated and interdisciplinary approach. The document aims to identify the distinct roles of women and men in the corruption system, assess how administrative and criminal sanctions are applied, and analyse the socio-demographic profiles of those involved. On this basis, the report will make

(3) The category of goods referred to in paragraph (1) shall not include election campaign materials and items paid for from the election fund, bearing the name and surname of the candidate or the name of the political party, signs or symbols of the electoral competitors, such as: posters, leaflets, postcards, calendars, notebooks, postcards, pens, lighters, matchboxes, badges, pins, CDs, DVDs, USB storage devices, pennants, flags, books, bags, T-shirts, caps, scarves, whose value per unit does not exceed two conventional units.

https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=150640&lang=ro#

⁶ https://sis.md/sites/default/files/comunicate/fisiere/Raport_SIS_Public_Interferenta_in_procesul_electoral.pdf

⁷ https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/9/d/578815_0.pdf

https://odhr.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/c/b/578857_0.pdf

⁸ https://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?docid=867&l=ro&tip=hotariri&utm_source=chatgpt.com

recommendations for improving the legal and administrative framework and developing public policies to prevent vote buying and protect electoral rights.

METHODOLOGY

PERIOD AND DATA SOURCES

The analysis was carried out by the Centre Partnership for Development (CPD) based on data collected between June and October 2025. The data sets cover incidents of electoral corruption reported between 1 September 2024 and 28 August 2025, a period that includes the electoral cycle for the 2025 elections. The data was obtained from multiple official sources, ensuring comprehensive coverage of the phenomenon.

First, information was collected from police inspectorates on administrative offence reports drawn up under Article 47¹ of the Administrative Offences Code of the Republic of Moldova sanctioning passive electoral corruption (the act of a voter requesting or receiving undue benefits in connection with the exercise of their right to vote). A total of 25,822 administrative offence cases were documented under this article during the analysed period. Second, a number of 4,205 court decisions issued by the courts of the Republic of Moldova were identified and processed in relation to cases of voter corruption at the administrative level (administrative fines imposed under Article 47¹). Third, the General Police Inspectorate (IGP) provided data on 77 criminal cases initiated under Article 181¹ of the Criminal Code – the act of voter corruption (active form of electoral corruption, consisting of offering money, goods or services to influence the vote). These 77 criminal cases involve 105 persons investigated or charged during the aforementioned reference period.

In addition to data on electoral corruption itself, the analysis also included contextual data. Information on political participation and representation in electoral processes of women was integrated (e.g. the proportion of women among candidates and elected officials, voter turnout by gender where such statistics were available), as well as official data on the results of the 2021 and 2025 elections at the national and local levels. Territorial demographic data (population structure by age group, gender and place of residence by administrative-territorial units) were also used to enable comparative analyses based on population characteristics and the geographical distribution of incidents related to electoral corruption.

OBJECTIVES OF THE ANALYSIS

The analysis of electoral corruption from a gender perspective pursues a series of interconnected objectives, defined in relation to the working hypotheses of the research. The first objective aims to identify the socio-demographic profiles of the individuals and the groups mostly exposed to involvement in electoral corruption, either as perpetrators or as beneficiaries of corruption practices. To this end, factors such as gender, age, occupation, place of residence (urban or rural), and other relevant characteristics are analysed to identify whether certain groups are more vulnerable or predisposed to offering or accepting electoral bribes. **The second objective** aims to evaluate the impact of gender on the sanctions applied in cases of electoral corruption. It examines whether significant differences exist in legal treatment or severity of punishment based on the gender of those involved (both perpetrators and victims) which could reveal potential discrepancies or biases in law enforcement. At the same time, the research aims to analyse the correlations between the incidence of electoral corruption and citizen participation in elections. In this context, it investigates the extent to which practices of voter corruption affect voter turnout or whether areas with high rates of electoral corruption exhibit particularities in electoral behaviour (e.g., fluctuations in turnout rates or changes in electoral results). Last but not least, a distinct objective of the study is to assess the effect of legal representation through a lawyer on case outcomes. It tests the hypothesis that assistance from a lawyer in administrative offence case or criminal proceedings can influence the results (such as the likelihood of punishing the defendant/offender or the severity of sanctions imposed) while also considering potential gender disparities in access to legal representation and its effects.

DATA SET STRUCTURE AND PROCESSING

The initial structure of the data reflected the origin of various sources, each with its own format and level of granularity. The data on administrative offences obtained from the police contained, for each report drawn up in accordance with Article 47¹, such information as the identity of the offender (surname, first name, gender), age, occupation, place of residence, description of the offence and circumstances, date of the offence and the proposed or applied sanction (administrative fine, as a rule). The set of data on court decisions included details on the decisions rendered (e.g. confirmed fine, warning, dismissal, etc.), any references to mitigating/aggravating circumstances, as well as procedural information (e.g. whether the defendant was represented by a lawyer, whether the decision was contested, etc.). The data provided by the IGP for criminal cases contained similar elements (data on defendants – number of persons and gender, nature of charges, stage of investigation or judicial proceedings); however these data were structured according to the specifics of the criminal investigation records (including an indication of the status of the persons involved – organisers, intermediaries, etc.). All these sets of data were combined and compared, where possible, to obtain a unified picture of each incident of electoral corruption. The corroboration of information from administrative offence reports with that from court decisions was carried out on the basis of common attributes (e.g. name and surname of the offender, date and place of the offence), in the absence of a unique case identifier – a significant challenge detailed in the section on methodological limitations below.

During the data cleaning process, a series of transformations and adjustments were applied to increase the accuracy and relevance of the integrated datasets. First, the age variable of the individuals involved was recoded into age categories to facilitate statistical analyses (e.g., grouping into standard categories: 18–25 years old, 26–35, 36–50, over 50 years old) and to protect personal data by avoiding individual identification. Second, the classification of occupations was simplified: given the very wide variety of occupations declared in the reports, occupations were aggregated into broader categories by socio-professional field (such as agriculture, education, unemployed, retired, etc.), thus reducing the granularity of occupational information to a level that allows general trends to be identified without losing the analytical essence.

In addition to that, for methodological reasons, cases from the diaspora were excluded from the final analysis set. Incidents of electoral corruption reported outside of the country (e.g. attempts to corrupt voters in the diaspora) were omitted, given that the available demographic and electoral data referred only to the population residing in the administrative-territorial units of the Republic of Moldova. Keeping these cases would have prevented accurate comparisons between regions and introduced uncontrollable heterogeneity (as conditions and context in the diaspora are different). The number of cases excluded was marginal, so the exclusion thereof does not affect the representativeness of the conclusions drawn up and increases the consistency of the analysis.

Additionally, during data processing, certain variables deemed irrelevant to the study's objectives or too difficult to standardize were removed. An example of such variable is "corpus delicti" – the material object of electoral corruption (goods, money or advantages offered). Although in theory this could have provided information about the nature of the illegal benefits (money, food, gifts, etc.), in practice it was found that the records on corpus delicti were incomplete, inconsistent and difficult to quantify, making difficult their statistical use. It was therefore decided to remove the "corpus delicti" variable from the unified set in order to simplify modelling and avoid information noise.

After completing all data cleaning, transformation, and validation steps, a consolidated final dataset was obtained, containing 4,307 unique electoral corruption cases. This number represents the total number of distinct incidents identified during the study period, resulting following the consolidation of three main sources (administrative offences – including those resolved in the court, and criminal offences) and the elimination of duplicates or unvalidated records. These 4,307 cases constitute the final database on which the statistical analyses described in the following section were applied.

METHODS OF ANALYSIS USED

The analytical process combined descriptive statistical methods with advanced quantitative models appropriate to the nature of the variables and research questions. In the first phase, the data were subjected to a detailed descriptive statistical analysis. Frequency distributions and percentages were calculated (e.g., distribution of cases by gender, age group, rural/urban place of residence, and region), as well as measures of central tendency and dispersion for numerical variables (such as the value of fines imposed, where applicable). The descriptive analysis highlighted the general characteristics of the phenomenon and the raw relationships between variables (e.g., comparing the incidence of electoral corruption between different rayons or identifying the proportion of women among offenders versus among criminal defendants). The descriptive results also served as a basis for subsequent modelling stages, by indicating potential associations that deserve more rigorous research.

In the next stage, in order to test specific hypotheses and quantify the effects of factors of interest, several regression models were estimated based on the nature of the dependent variable analysed. Poisson regression models were used where a count variable was examined – for example, to model the incidence of electoral corruption cases in a territorial unit as a function of certain demographic predictors (Poisson regression being suitable for variables counting events per unit, when the mean is close to the variance). Logistic regression (logit) models were also constructed for situations where the dependent variable was dichotomous. One example is the probability that an offender will receive a severe penalty (e.g., maximum fine or additional penalty) depending on their gender and the presence of a lawyer; in this case, the logistic model estimated the relative chances of a severe penalty being applied, while also allowing for control for variables such as age, previous offences, or place of residence. For qualitative results with multiple ordinal or unordered categories, multinomial regressions were applied. For example, the typology of offences (no penalty, warning, small fine, large fine) was modelled using multinomial regression to determine how predictors (including the offender's gender) influence the probability of each type of sanctioning outcome. In addition, when continuous quantitative variables were analysed as outcomes (such as the exact amount of the fine imposed in lei or the length of the sentence in any criminal cases resulting in a conviction), classical linear regression was used, with prior verification of the assumptions of application (normality of errors, homoscedasticity, etc.) and logarithmic transformation of financial variables if the distribution required it. All models were adjusted for statistical significance and goodness of fit, with the relevant coefficients being reported (including relative risks (RR) for Poisson, odds ratios (OR) for logistic and relative odds ratios for multinomial, respectively linear regression coefficients and effect sizes for linear models).

In addition to these deductive approaches, exploratory analyses were also used to uncover hidden patterns in the data. In particular, a *k*-means cluster analysis was applied to group cases into homogeneous segments based on key characteristics. This procedure allowed the identification of dominant profiles of electoral corruption cases: for example, distinct clusters could be delineated, such as "electoral corruption in rural areas, involving elderly voters" vs. "urban cases involving certain political actors" or "organised criminal groups for the corruption of voters". *Cluster analysis* thus provided a complementary perspective on the data, independent of the initial assumptions, helping to validate and nuance the conclusions drawn from the regression models. The entire analytical process was carried out using specialised statistical analysis software (e.g. SPSS and R), ensuring the reproducibility of the results and the correct application of the relevant statistical tests (significance tests, confidence intervals, information criteria for model selection, etc.).

METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

Although the methodological approach was designed to ensure rigour and comprehensiveness, a number of limitations and challenges were encountered during the analysis that are worth mentioning, as they may influence the interpretation of the conclusions. The first problem encountered was the lack of unique identifiers common to different data sets (police and courts), which made it difficult to directly correlate the administrative offence reports with the corresponding court decisions. In the absence of a

uniform case ID, data matching was based on manual or semi-automated matching by name, date and other descriptive elements, a method that involves a degree of uncertainty. For example, data on administrative offences provided by the General Police Inspectorate (IGP) used for the analysis of reports drawn up under Article 47¹ of the Code on Administrative Offences were predominantly operational in nature, being collected for the purpose of establishing the offence and initially applying the sanction, not for statistical or gender analysis. As a result, for some criteria relevant to the research, the information was incomplete, missing or unevenly filled in. In particular, the variable concerning the occupational status of persons against whom administrative offence reports were drawn up was entered inconsistently for the same criterion (e.g. through detailed descriptions, general remarks or administrative abbreviations), and in many cases it was not filled in at all. Similar situations were found for other socio-demographic variables, such as activity or social status. These inconsistencies subsequently required a process of standardisation and recoding of data and, where reliable completion was not possible, the exclusion of corresponding observations from certain analyses. As a result, some cases may not have been correctly aligned, or some duplicates may have remained unidentified initially. To minimise these risks, iterative *data matching* procedures and additional manual checks on samples were used, but uncertainty about the exact link between police and court records remains a limitation. This particularly affects the ability to track each case from the stage of administrative offence to the final court decision, which may lead to the exclusion from the analysis of observations that could not be linked in a reliable manner.

A second category of methodological limitations concerns the quality, structure and practical usefulness of the primary data provided by the Agency for Digitalisation in Justice and Judicial Administration (ADJAJ), the institution responsible for the management of the information systems in courts. The data set provided by ADJAJ was predominantly technical and aggregated in nature, not including disaggregated data essential for analysis, such as the gender, age, place of residence or occupation of the persons concerned, which is indispensable for a rigorous gender and socio-demographic analysis. Furthermore, the structure of the database provided by ADJAJ did not allow for the direct and reliable identification of cases on the court portal. In practice, the court portal allows the search of cases exclusively on the basis of limited criteria – case number, first and last name of the party or subject matter of the case. However, the data received from ADJAJ often contained incomplete, erroneous or unrelated case numbers, and the "subject matter of the case" field was either missing, inconsistently formulated or incorrectly entered. Under these circumstances, entering the available information into the search engine of the court portal either generated no results or led to the identification of cases other than those indicated in the database. To overcome these limitations, the CPD team had to perform extensive manual checks, consisting of individually accessing the court portal, identifying cases that could be correlated by combinations of criteria (name, court, approximate period) and subsequently filling in the missing information by directly examining the published decisions. This process also revealed a significant rate of duplication of records in the database offered by ADJAJ, with the same case being listed several times, with minor variations in identification data, which required an additional deduplication process. At the same time, during the checks it was found that some of the files indicated in the database as relating to Article 47¹ of the Code on Administrative Offences did not in fact concern acts of electoral corruption. In some cases, the files identified on the court portal concerned other offences or administrative disputes, although in the database they were classified under the article relevant to passive electoral corruption. These inconsistencies required the exclusion of those cases from the sample in order to avoid inclusion of irrelevant cases and the distortion of the results. After the process of identifying, validating and deduplicating the cases was completed, the consolidated database, which contained only the cases that could be identified with certainty on the court portal, was sent to the General Police Inspectorate (IGP) in order to fill in the missing information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the persons concerned. This stage aimed to increase the accuracy and completeness of the data used in the analysis, within the limits of the information available to the investigating authority.

Lastly, inconsistencies were identified between the data batches provided by the IGP concerning criminal case files. Initially, information on 77 criminal cases (Art. 181¹ of the Criminal Code) was transmitted in stages, and some cases appeared duplicated or with details updated differently between batches (e.g. the number of persons involved in a case could vary as the investigation progressed and

additional persons were identified). To manage this issue, the subsequent lists received from the IGP were manually reconciled, keeping the latest available version of the data for each criminal case (including the final number of defendants, the current status of the case, etc.). The lack of standardisation in data entry thus required adjustments and decisions to integrate multiple sources, increasing the processing effort and the possibility of residual errors.

Despite these limitations, the remedial measures applied (cleaning, cross-checking, exclusion of doubtful cases) allow a high degree of confidence in the quality of the final database of 4,307 unique cases analysed. However, the conclusions should be interpreted with due caution, taking into account the potential sources of error mentioned above and the fact that certain aspects (such as the impossibility of perfectly linking all administrative offence cases with their subsequent court outcomes) may be the cause of a margin of uncertainty. Overall, the methodology remains robust and appropriate to the proposed objectives, and the lessons learned from these challenges highlight the need to improve judicial and administrative offence data collection systems (such as the introduction of unique case identifiers and uniform reporting standards) for future research of this type.

JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND PROCEDURAL VULNERABILITIES IN ELECTORAL CORRUPTION CASES



JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND PROCEDURAL VULNERABILITIES IN ELECTORAL CORRUPTION CASES

Although the analysis of court decisions was not the main objective of the research, the massive collection of court rulings allowed for the observation of recurring patterns in the way the justice system examined these cases. As part of this effort, over 4,300 decisions rendered by the courts of first instance were extracted and processed in order to identify demographic information relevant to gender analysis. However, the process of technical collection of data revealed several systemic trends and vulnerabilities: standardisation of reasoning, excessive use of templates, unjustified differences between courts in resolving contestations, as well as data access issues caused by inconsistent publication and uneven depersonalisation. Although this is a side effect of the coding effort, it offers an essential perspective on the structural limitations of the judicial system in managing an unprecedented volume of administrative offence cases, implicitly reflecting the challenges of ensuring fairness, consistency and transparency in decision-making.

The inconsistency in classifying and labelling cases in the search engine of the court portal affects the accuracy of statistical data and the identification of cases. In the process of collecting data from ADJAJ records and studying available public data, inconsistencies were found in the reflection of cases of electoral corruption (Art. 47¹ CC), which required additional checks directly on the court portal. For example, in the case of Cimişlia District Court, no cases appeared in the ADJAJ data, although 44 decisions to dismiss administrative offence reports were reported in the public domain, and this discrepancy led to an extensive manual search on the portal and subsequent identification of decisions that were not properly reflected in the centralised lists. During these checks, it was found that the courts fail to fill in the information in the "Subject of the case" or "Case theme" section in a uniform manner, and as a result, cases cannot be consistently found using a single criterion. Some cases can only be identified by searching for the offence, others only by the phrase "electoral corruption", and others only by entering the number of the administrative offence report, while some of the decisions appear under the heading "Other categories", which is used inconsistently from one court to another. The search on the portal also highlighted problems with the quality of the records, including duplications between the cases provided, failure of some decisions to be published, and erroneous labelling as "electoral corruption" for cases that, in content, concerned other types of offences. Overall, inconsistencies in the completion and publication of information undermine the accuracy of statistical data and hinder the clear identification of cases on the portal, this fact highlighting the need to standardize and correct these practices to ensure complete, comparable, and easily traceable records.

Non-compliance with practices for publishing and anonymizing decisions compromises personal data protection and has complicated data extraction. Depersonalization is applied inconsistently across courts: some rulings leave sensitive identifiers visible, such as IDNP, age, name, and address, while others anonymize excessively, even concealing the court's location and the rayon police station. In addition, in some courts, decisions are published only in Russian, without a Romanian version, contrary to Article 379 of the Code on Administrative Offences and Article 9 para.(4) of Law No. 514/1995 on the organisation of the judiciary, which regulates the language of administrative proceedings and the right to an interpreter. The legal framework provides for the proceedings to be conducted in Romanian, and when the proceedings are conducted in a language accepted by the majority of participants, the procedural documents must also be drawn up in Romanian. This practice reduces the accessibility of data.

The reasoning in the court decisions is almost identical, regardless of whether the contestation is upheld or dismissed. One noticeable feature is the high degree of uniformity in the reasoning part of the court decisions. In many cases, regardless of whether the contested decision is upheld or dismissed, the same wording and reasoning are used, which gives the impression of a standardised assessment rather than an analysis tailored to the facts and evidence of each case. An analysis of the decisions during the reference period shows that more than half of the appeals are dismissed; however, there are differences between courts: in Basarabeasca, Cimişlia, and Cahul, there is a higher proportion of admissions than in other localities. This variation suggests that the personal conviction of the judge sometimes carries more weight

than the consistency of practice at the national level. The data extraction confirms this argumentative uniformity: a limited set of considerations is repeated with minimal variation from one case to another. Admission decisions are mainly partial and most often concern the reduction of fines; full admission, with the dismissal of the administrative offence report, is sporadic, with some courts practically never granting it and others granting it predominantly. Overall, these features diminish the individualisation of cases and affect the predictability of case law.

Several other issues have been observed. For example, in a number of cases, offenders signed the administrative offence reports without raising objections, and subsequent contestations were standardised in content, often in the absence of the defence lawyer. At the same time, in several cases, postponements were requested in order to identify a defence lawyer, including on the grounds of a strike; however, the court usually dismissed these requests. Furthermore, in numerous cases, lawyers filed appeals but failed to appear before the court, and this is a situation that arises in the context of a very large volume of cases and overlapping deadlines. Together, these elements describe practical difficulties in the effective exercise of defence and in the management of proceedings at the level of courts.

SOCIAL DISPARITIES IN THE SANCTIONING OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES




1.1 ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCE REPORTS

In the period between 1 September 2024 and 28 August 2025, the authorities have recorded 25,822 administrative offence reports on passive electoral corruption, in accordance with Article 47¹ of the Code on Administrative Offences. This number is equivalent to approximately 1.1% of the population of the Republic of Moldova, reflecting the scale of the phenomenon at the national level. This is a first indication of the overall gross rate of electoral corruption (assuming that there are no multiple reports filed against the same offender⁹). The subsequent analysis illustrates the social structure of individuals sanctioned and the possible disparities between groups in terms of gender, age, place of residence, occupation and region. The analysis also employs statistical and econometric tools to examine the predisposition of different social groups to engage in such acts, aiming to highlight social disparities. The data and interpretations presented in this section are based exclusively on the administrative offence reports analysed during the reference period (1 September 2024 – 28 August 2025) and cannot be considered representing the entire population, as they do not reflect all the reports drawn up as a whole until present, nor the number of people who may have committed the offence but have not been identified or sanctioned.

The data indicates a higher proportion of women among those cited in administrative offence reports for passive electoral corruption. According to the data, 61.9% of offenders in the sample of reports analysed are women, which contradicts the common perception that men are more likely to be involved in illegal activities related to the electoral process. In order to understand the predisposition of certain groups to get involved in passive electoral corruption (absolute and relative offence rates), the data set on police reports was combined with demographic data on rayons/municipalities, places of residence, gender and age. The results of the analysis indicate an absolute offence rate, defined as the ratio of the number of offenders reported to the total population of the group analysed, which represents 1.56% among women and 1.18% among men; this fact suggests a higher probability of women to be involved in such acts. An analysis of these probabilities using the Poisson regression model, in which women are used as the reference group, shows that the relative offence rate among men is significantly lower, by about 20%, a difference that is relevant from both statistical and socio-economic point of view. These results are based on the assumption that police do not apply differential treatment in the process of identification and sanctioning. Therefore, the observed difference may reflect a greater socio-economic vulnerability of women, which makes them more exposed to the pressures and incentives used by the networks involved in vote buying.

Figure 1. Gender distribution of individuals subject to administrative offence reports for passive electoral corruption, %




Source: CPD calculations based on a set of 25,822 administrative offence reports analysed (2025)

The average age of offenders is 52.6 years old, with slightly higher values among women (53.6 years old) compared to men (50.9 years old). In terms of place of residence, people in urban areas are older (54.2 years old) than those in rural areas (51 years old), a difference that may reflect variations in the socio-

⁹ An offender refers to a natural or legal person against whom an administrative offence report has been drawn up, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences. This chapter will use this legal terminology.

economic context and exposure to electoral influence networks. The age structure differs noticeably between regions. Older individuals (65+) cited in administrative offence reports are more concentrated in Chişinău and the Southern region. In the North and Centre, the structure is more balanced, with a relatively even distribution between 35–49 and 50–64 age cohorts, indicating broader involvement of the working population. In all regions, young people (aged 15–34) remain the least represented category, suggesting that the predisposition to passive electoral corruption increases with age.


Figure 2. Average age of individuals cited in the administrative offence reports on passive electoral corruption, age and %



Source: Data processed by the CPD based on 25,822 administrative offence reports (2025)

A more detailed analysis shows that older people (60+) are predominant among those suspected of passive electoral corruption, confirming that older age groups are becoming more vulnerable. Thus, 38.1% of administrative offence reports drawn up during the reference period envisage persons aged 60+. From the perspective of absolute offence rates, which indicate the predisposition of a person in a particular age group to be involved in such an offence, clear differences can be observed: those in the 35-49, 50-64 and 65+ age cohorts have very similar offence rates (around 1.51% on average); however these are much higher than those in the 19-34 age group (around 0.96%). From a gender perspective, men are predominant in the 30-49 age group, while in older age groups this situation is reversed, where women become the majority. The 60–69 age group has the highest percentage of fines among women (24.9%), followed by the 70+ age group (16.6%). This concentration among older women suggests a more pronounced structural vulnerability, possibly associated with factors such as social isolation, economic precariousness and dependence on informal support networks.

Figure 3. Age distribution of individuals cited in administrative offence reports for passive electoral corruption, %




Source: CPD calculations based on a set of 25,822 administrative offence reports analysed (2025)

Over 85% of offenders did not have an active job, with women predominating in the category of pensioners. Most of the offenders in the analysed reports come from among people without a declared job (57.5%), followed by pensioners (28.3%). The breakdown by gender provides important clarifications: men make up the majority (63.3%) of the total number of unemployed persons, while women predominate among pensioners targeted by administrative offence reports (32.4% compared to 21.7%). This distribution reinforces the vulnerability profile outlined earlier in the previous graphs, especially in

the case of elderly women without active income, who may become targets of electoral corruption campaigns. These data reinforce the hypothesis that economic factors – especially professional inactivity – are directly correlated with the predisposition to accept electoral bribes, and prevention policies should explicitly target the most exposed socio-economic categories.


Figure 4. Occupational status of individuals cited in administrative offence reports for passive electoral corruption, total and by gender, %



Source: Data processed by CPD based on 25,822 administrative offence reports (2025)

Urban residents appear more susceptible to electoral corruption than those in rural areas. Analysis by place of residence indicates that, in absolute terms, individuals cited in administrative offence reports for passive electoral corruption are residing in rural areas more frequently, accounting for 52.8% of the total. However, analysis of offence rates indicates a higher predisposition for involvement in such acts in urban areas. Having reported the number of offenders to the total population in each area shows an offence rate of 1.49% in urban areas, compared to 1.31% in rural areas. In other words, even though more cases are identified in rural areas in the analysed reports, a city dweller is more likely to be involved in passive electoral corruption. This result confirms that the predisposition to electoral corruption is influenced not only by individual characteristics, but also by the context of residence, which can facilitate different forms of access to and organisation of electoral influence practices.

Figure 5. Place of residence of individuals cited in administrative offence reports for passive electoral corruption, %




Source: CPD calculations based on the set of 25,822 analysed administrative offence reports (2025)

Geographically, the Northern region recorded the highest number of administrative offence reports (for the reference period examined). Thus, of the total number of cases recorded, 39.1% came from the Northern region, 28.4% from the Southern region and 17.1% from the Central region. At a more detailed territorial level, Chişinău (15.4%) and Gagauzia (13.1%) recorded the highest proportion of cases, followed by Bălţi (8.0%) and Orhei (5.3%), while several rayons, such as Bender, Ialoveni, Nisporeni, Şoldăneşti and Criuleni, each accounted for less than 1% of the total number of reports. These variations may reflect both the size of the population and the intensity of electoral corruption networks in certain areas. In large urban areas (Chişinău, Bălţi), voters' exposure to such practices may be linked to organised campaigns and the

mobilisation of vulnerable groups in densely populated neighbourhoods. In Gagauzia, the high proportion of cases suggests a systemic presence of vote-influencing mechanisms, which requires further investigation. Territorial discrepancies may also be influenced by the way enforcement measures were applied, the resources available at the local level, and the degree of institutional cooperation.


Figure 6. Distribution of administrative offence reports on passive electoral corruption by regions and rayons, %



Source: Data processed by CPD based on 25,822 administrative offence reports (2025)

Relatively similar trends in terms of territory can also be observed when referring to the predisposition to engage in passive electoral corruption. If we take Anenii Noi rayon as a reference group (being the first in alphabetical order), we can see that in Gagauzia the rates of offences (predisposition) are almost four times higher than in the reference group, and in Taraclia, Râşcani, Orhei, Ocnîţa, Glodeni, Făleşti, Basarabeasca, Bălţi and several other rayons – three times higher. On the other hand, in the rayons from the Central region (Străşeni, Nisporeni, Ialoveni, Hînceşti, Călăraşi, Criuleni, Chişinău municipality), the rate of offences is much lower than in the reference group. Accordingly, the Northern and Southern regions show a higher predisposition to involvement in acts of corruption.

Figure 7. Estimated relative offence rate (predisposition) by territory and associated 95% confidence intervals¹⁰



Source: CPD calculations based on a set of 25,822 administrative offence reports analysed (2025)

An important aspect of the data analysis is identifying homogeneous groups, essentially - the typical profiles of offenders. It is important to note that these typical profiles do not necessarily coincide with the groups with the highest frequencies, rather with those groups demonstrating a high level of internal cohesion (similarity) and are clearly distinct from the rest of the observations, including through extreme or rare values, separated from other combinations of characteristics. For example, even if only 15% of offenders come from a particular region with a low demographic weight, but differ in terms of average

¹⁰ The broken red vertical line represents the unit value. The orange dots to the right of the unit value show that the group in question has a higher administrative offence rate than the reference group.

age, occupation or other socio-demographic characteristics from the rest of the sample, this group may constitute a distinct cluster, i.e. a typical profile. Various statistical analysis methods can be applied to understand the typologies of offenders; however, given the nature of the data used in this study, the k-prototypes method was chosen. Following the application of this method, four typical offender profiles were identified. Of these, three profiles are dominated by women, and in three of the four profiles the age above 40 is characteristic. At the same time, none of the identified profiles include the occupation option "employee", being represented exclusively by the categories "pensioner" or "unemployed". These clusters once again confirm the greater vulnerability of older women to potential acts of passive electoral corruption, as well as their overall economic vulnerability.


Table 1. Typical profiles of offenders

Cluster	Gender	Age	Region	Occupation	Residence
1	Male	39	North	unemployed	rural
2	Female	69	North	retired	rural
3	Female	44	Centre	unemployed	rural
4	Female	51	North	unemployed	urban

Source: CPD calculations based on a set of 25,822 administrative offence reports analysed (2025)

A more in-depth analysis of the data reveals correlation between involvement in passive electoral corruption and women's participation and representation in politics. To explore this relationship, women's political participation was measured by the proportion of women candidates in the total number of candidates for local elected office (mayors, local councilors and rayon/municipal councilors), and political representation by the proportion of women currently holding these positions. The results obtained provide a rather positive response in the case of local council positions, where there is an association between higher levels of women's participation and representation and lower rates of offences. However, this finding should be interpreted with caution, as the analysis is based on a relatively small number of observations, and the exclusion of one or two extreme observations reduces the identified correlation. In case of such positions as mayor and rayon/municipal councilor, the available data do not confirm the existence of a consistent relationship between the level of electoral corruption and women's political participation or representation. This topic warrants further research as new data are accumulated at a more detailed level of disaggregation.

Figure 8. Absolute offence rates by gender and rates of women's participation and representation in local elected office



Source: CPD calculations based on a set of 25,822 administrative offence reports analysed (2025)


1.2 COURT ANALYSIS: CONTESTATIONS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCE CASES

During the period under review, the courts of the Republic of Moldova resolved a significant number of contestations against administrative offence reports drawn up under Article 47¹ of the Code of Administrative Offences. Of all the judgments rendered, this study has identified, selected and validated for analysis a set of 4,205 court decisions containing sufficient information to examine the profile of the contestants, their access to legal assistance, the amount of penalties imposed and the types of solutions rendered by the courts. The analysis also aims to identify any differences in treatment based on gender, age, occupation and place of residence, as well as the impact of legal representation on the outcome of the proceedings. The data and interpretations presented in this chapter are based exclusively on 4,205 court decisions selected and validated for research and do not reflect all the appeals resolved by the courts during the reference period (1 September 2024 – 1 August 2025). Due to structural limitations of the judicial record-keeping systems, the lack of uniform data entry model and difficulties in identifying relevant cases in the official databases, some of the judgments rendered by the courts could not be included in the analysis. Therefore, the conclusions reflect observable trends in judicial practice related to the sample analysed, without being generalised to the entire national case law.

Approximately two-thirds of court decisions on appeals against administrative offence reports on passive electoral corruption concern cases filed against women. In the sample consisting of 4,205 decisions analysed, 63.9% concern administrative offence reports issued against women and 36.1% against men. This distribution confirms previous observations regarding administrative offence reports, where most offenders are women, which also explains the significantly higher presence of women among those who end up in court. Based on the assumption of institutional neutrality, i.e. that courts and police do not apply different treatment based on gender in their findings and decisions, the observed difference may indicate a greater socio-economic vulnerability of women, as well as a reduced capacity to challenge or represent themselves, leading them to be more frequently involved in proceeding files.

From an age perspective, administrative offence cases brought before the courts are predominantly concentrated among mature and pre-retirement age groups: more than three quarters of the decisions concern people aged between 40 and 69, with peaks of 20–23% in the 50-59 and 60-69 age groups. Cases involving individuals under the age of 30 account for less than 8% of the total, and those involving individuals over the age of 70 account for approximately 11%. This distribution shows that involvement in passive electoral corruption and its contestation in court is dominated by mature age groups, while young people are less present in the offence statistics, either because they are less likely to be involved (as shown by the data in the previous sections) or because the mechanisms through which corruption manifests itself among them is not present in official records.

Figure 9. Distribution by gender and age of persons involved in court cases, %




Source: CPD calculations based on the dataset on court decisions (4,205 cases, 2025)

Women become more vulnerable in older age groups, while men become more vulnerable in active age groups. The previous graph showed that two-thirds of court decisions concern women and more than three-quarters of cases concern people aged 40–69. Below, we break down this distribution to understand how age categories are divided by gender. We note that men have a slightly higher share in the 40–59 age group, while women become the majority in the 60+ cohort. In younger age group (18–29), men are more frequently involved than women. This breakdown confirms and explains why, in the overall picture,

women account for 63.9% of offenders – they become predominant in the older age groups, while men are dominant in active age groups, which have a relatively smaller share overall. This structure suggests that prevention measures should consider both the economic life cycle and the fact that recruitment mechanisms in vote-buying networks work differently for women and men.


Figure 10. Distribution of court cases by gender and age group, %



Source: CPD calculations based on the dataset on court decisions (4,205 cases, 2025)

More than half of the administrative offence cases contested in court for passive electoral corruption originate from rural areas (56.8%), while 43.2% concern individuals residing in urban areas. These data are consistent with the higher proportion of rural residents against whom administrative offence reports have been drawn up. However, given the previous conclusions showing that urban residents are more prone to engage in electoral corruption than rural residents, we can assume that the 13 % difference in court cases reflects rather the size of the rural population and the fact that a large proportion of offenders have not contested the reports. At the regional level, the proportion of appeals is the highest in the North (67.4% of the total), while the Centre and South contribute approximately 13–14% each. This concentration in the North confirms the conclusions of the report, which identified Bălți and other Northern rayons as having the highest rates of offences, while Chişinău and the rayons in the Centre were at the opposite end of the spectrum. Greater economic vulnerability in rural areas, well-structured informal relationships and active involvement of political groups in the North of the country have led to a higher number of reports and, implicitly, appeals. At the same time, the low proportion of appeals in Chişinău may reflect either a lower incidence of voter corruption in the capital or better prevention and civic awareness, which would reduce both the number of offences and the willingness of offenders to appeal the sanction.

Figure 11. Distribution of court cases by place of residence, %




Source: CPD calculations based on the court decisions dataset (4,205 cases, 2025)

The data indicate clear occupational profile of persons challenging administrative offence reports for passive electoral corruption in courts – unemployed persons. At the aggregate level, almost two-thirds of individuals who contested the reports are unemployed (64.3%), followed at a distance by pensioners (19.5%). This structure is broadly maintained in the breakdown by gender, with some relevant nuances: unemployed men are slightly more present than women (67.4% compared to 62.5%), while women have

a higher share among pensioners (21.1% compared to 16.7%). The differences between women and men are smaller in the category of employed persons, which suggests that occupational status is an important factor in shaping the profile of claimants. Overall, the data confirm that people outside the active labour market (unemployed and retired) are more frequently sanctioned but also show a greater predisposition to file appeals in courts against the decisions.


Figure 12. Distribution of court cases by occupational status of claimants, %



Source: CPD calculations based on the court decisions dataset (4,205 cases, 2025)

Over 60% of individuals having challenged the sanctions for passive electoral corruption in court benefited from legal assistance, this fact indicating a relatively high level of reference to lawyers for assistance in administrative offence proceedings. From a gender perspective, the distribution is uneven: 65.6% of cases resolved with legal assistance involved women, compared to 34.4% involving men. This aligns with the logistic models presented in the report, which indicate a slightly higher likelihood for women to receive lawyer assistance than men. At the same time, the difference of approximately four percentage points between men with a lawyer (34.4%) and those without a lawyer (38.9%) suggests that their access to legal assistance is more limited, possibly for socio-economic reasons or because of a different perception of legal risks. An additional relevant element is the age structure of individuals assisted by a lawyer: over 20% of them are over 60 years old, being, for the most part, pensioners, a category generally characterised by limited financial resources. This raises legitimate questions about the actual financial capacity of the claimants to bear the costs of legal assistance and the sources of funding, given that most of the persons who challenged the reports are unemployed or retired. In this context, the relatively high frequency of legal representation may indicate either the existence of informal legal support mechanisms or the involvement of third parties interested in supporting the challenge of sanctions, issues that deserve further analysis in assessing the dynamics of passive electoral corruption and the chains of responsibility associated with it.

Figure 13. Distribution of legal representation in court cases concerning passive electoral corruption, by gender and age %



Source: CPD calculations based on the court decisions dataset (4,205 cases, 2025)

The presence of a lawyer is determined by several individual factors relating to the claimant. To understand this relationship, a logistic model was applied to explain the probability of a claimant being represented by a lawyer based on their characteristics. The results confirm and detail the descriptive observations regarding the relatively high presence of lawyers in the cases analysed (see Annex 1, Table A1). From a gender perspective, women are more likely to be assisted by a lawyer (63%) than men (58%),

a difference that reinforces the conclusion that women not only challenge sanctions more frequently, but they also make greater use of formal legal defence mechanisms. The place of residence also influences access to a lawyer: the probability is higher in urban areas (69%) than in rural areas (63%), suggesting easier access to legal services in towns. However, regional differences are the most evident. Claimants in the Central (63%) and Northern (60%) regions are relatively likely to be represented by a lawyer, while in the South (29%), and especially in Chişinău and Gagauzia (16% each), the probability is considerably lower. Occupational status also plays an important role: the unemployed (73%) and employees (71%) are most likely to benefit from a lawyer, followed by pensioners (67%), a very relevant aspect to analyse in the context where most claimants come from categories with limited economic resources. Age has a gradual effect, with the probability of benefiting from a lawyer’s assistance increasing almost linearly with age, from 60% among young people to 66% among the elderly. Overall, these results show that the presence of a lawyer is not random, but systematically correlated with gender, place of residence, region, occupation and age of the claimants. The earlier conclusion regarding the high level of legal assistance in contested cases is reinforced, highlighting that even among unemployed or retired individuals, recourse to a lawyer is frequent—raising ongoing questions about the mechanisms of access to and financing of legal defence in such cases.

A more detailed analysis of the data enabled the development of a typical profile of individuals who challenged the reports in court, strongly shaped by gender, age, and occupation. The k-prototypes method was used to identify the profile of the challengers, which allowed the observations in the sample to be grouped according to homogeneous categorical variables. A typical profile brings together people with similar characteristics (gender, age, region, occupation and place of residence), even if their share in the sample is small. Based on this algorithm, the analysis identified five typical profiles among individuals who challenged administrative offence reports in court. All profiles are represented by women, whose ages range from 39 to 67. Three of these clusters come from the Northern region, one from Chişinău and one from the South. All individuals in these groups are unemployed or retired, and in most cases their appeals were dismissed, with the court upholding the fine. The only exception is the cluster from the South, consisting of 50-year-old women who are unemployed and are residing in rural areas.

Table1 . Typical profiles of offenders who challenged the reports in court


Cluster	Gender	Age	Region	Occupation	Presence of a solicitor	Residence
1	Female	39	Chişinău	unemployed	no lawyer	urban
2	Female	54	North	unemployed	with lawyer	urban
3	Female	67	North	retired	with lawyer	rural
4	Female	50	South	unemployed	no lawyer	rural
5	Female	42	North	unemployed	with lawyer	rural

Source: CPD calculations based on court decisions dataset (4205 cases, 2025)

Most of those who challenged the reports in court were fined an initial amount of 500 conventional units. The data on the initial fine show a relatively concentrated distribution of sanctions around the standard threshold, with moderate differences between women and men. At the aggregate level, most fines are at the level of 500 conventional units, a category that accounts for almost 58% of all cases. Smaller fines, up to 500 conventional units, account for a small proportion (less than 3%), and the 501–749 conventional units range is almost marginal (less than 2%), suggesting that the police rarely resort to intermediate sanctions. Gender differences are particularly noticeable in the maximum fines (750 u.c.). Women receive this higher sanction more frequently (39.4%) than men (34.3%). At the same time, men are more often fined the standard amount of 500 u.c.¹¹ (61.2%, compared to 56.0% for women), suggesting a tendency to apply the maximum penalty more frequently to women. Overall, the distribution indicates that gender differences are not extreme, but they are systematic, manifesting themselves in particular in a higher probability of women receiving fines at the upper level of the sanction provided for by law.

¹¹ u.c. refers to conventional unit, which is a statutory unit used in Moldovan contravention law.

Figure 14. Initial amount of the fine, by gender, %




Source: CPD calculations based on the court decisions dataset (4205 cases, 2025)

The level of fines imposed by police differs according to gender and other individual factors. To identify this correlation, a standard linear regression model was estimated. The results indicate relatively small but systematic differences between groups (see Annex 3, Table A2). Thus, men receive, on average, fines that are approximately 1.5% lower than women, which corresponds to a difference of about 14 lei, suggesting that gender has a small financial impact. Age has statistically more significant but rather modest impact in monetary terms: each additional year of life is associated with an increase in the fine of only 0.06%; however, when viewed in aggregate, the difference becomes more noticeable, with people aged 65 and above receiving fines that are approximately 3% higher than young people in the 19–34 age group. A much more important factor is the place of residence, with urban residents receiving fines that are about 7% higher than those in rural areas. In contrast, occupational status does not significantly influence the level of the fine, once other factors are under control. However, regional differences are more evident: Chişinău and the Northern region stand out with fines that are approximately 20% higher than in the Central region, while the differences between the Centre, South and Gagauzia regions are not statistically or financially relevant. Overall, the results suggest that variations in the amount of fines are determined more by territorial and environmental factors rather than by individual characteristics such as occupation or gender.

An analysis of court decisions shows that they upheld 72.5% of all contested administrative offence reports in full or in part. Figure 14 shows a high rate of upheld contested administrative offence reports, confirming the limited success of appeals in cases of passive electoral corruption. Thus, 64.4% of appeals were dismissed in full, and 8.1% were only partially upheld, meaning that in over 72% of cases the courts confirmed, in full or in essence, the sanctions imposed by the police. This result suggests that legal proceedings generally have little impact on the cancellation of reports. Only 23.9% of appeals were upheld in full, leading to the overturn of reports, while the rest of the solutions (returned, no further action or closed) have a marginal share. The analysis by gender highlights moderate but consistent differences. Women have a higher rate of dismissal of appeals (65.6%) compared to men (62.2%), suggesting that reports issued against women are more frequently upheld by the court. Conversely, men are more likely to succeed in having the report overturned: 27% of their appeals are upheld in full, compared to 22.2% in case of women. The differences are smaller in the case of partial admissions, where the proportions are similar for both sexes. The summary representation on the right side of the graph highlights this asymmetry: of the appeals upheld, 59.2% belong to women and 40.8% to men, but women also account for a higher proportion of dismissed appeals (65.1%). This reflects not only the gender distribution of the claimants, but also the relatively lower chances of obtaining a favourable outcome for women, which correlates with their more vulnerable socio-economic profile highlighted in previous analyses.


Figure 15. Distribution of appeals against administrative offence reports by court decision, %



Source: CPD calculations based on the court decisions dataset (4,205 cases, 2025)

Following the examination of appeals, the structure of sanctions remains concentrated around standard values. Almost half of the fines (44.9%) are set in the amount of 500 u.c., followed by maximum fines of 750 u.c. (25.5%). Approximately a quarter of cases (25.8%) are concluded without a fine (0 u.c.), while reduced sanctions below 500 u.c. account for a small proportion (2.6%), indicating limited application of mitigated sanctions. Gender differences are moderate but consistent with previous results. Women are more likely to receive fines at the maximum level of 750 u.c. (26.7%) compared to men (23.4%), and men are more likely to have their fines overturned entirely (28.8% compared to 24.2% for women). The similar distribution of fines of 500 u.c. for both sexes suggests that courts tend to maintain the standard level of punishment, but differences appear at the extremes, where women are more likely to receive the maximum penalty and men are slightly more likely to have their fines reduced or overturned.

Figure 16. Final amount of the fine, following the court decision, by gender




Source: CPD calculations based on the court decisions dataset (4205 cases, 2025)

Court decisions show that most of those sanctioned for passive electoral corruption fail to change the decision of the police on the amount of the fine. Specifically, in 70% of cases, the court maintains the initial fine, in 27% it cancels it completely, and only in a tiny 3% of cases does it choose to reduce it. Although the raw descriptive data suggests small variations between genders, the multinomial regression model shows that both the gender of the offender and the presence or absence of a lawyer have negligible importance on the final probability of maintaining or cancelling the sanction (see Annex 3, Table A3). In contrast, socio-geographical factors and occupational status appear to be critical determinants: rural residents are 4 % less likely than urban residents to have their fines cancelled (16% versus 20%). The chances of modification vary much more widely across regions. For example, residents of the Southern region have an almost equal chance of having their fine cancelled or upheld. In Gagauzia, the chance of having the fine cancelled is about 27%, while in the North, Centre and Chişinău it varies from 10% to 15%. Occupational status is also an important determinant of the final decision: unemployed persons and

pensioners have a 30% and 27% chance, respectively, of having their fines cancelled in court, compared to 22% for employed individuals and 16% for those in other occupations.


Figure 17. Court decision on the final fine imposed for passive electoral corruption, by gender, %



Source: CPD calculations based on the court decisions dataset (4,205 cases, 2025)

Beyond the likelihood of obtaining the cancellation of the sanction, the data also reveal significant variations in the amount of final fines imposed by the courts. Although the overall average fine is 21,550 (units/lei), the heaviest financial burden falls on students, who face an average of 29,167 lei, and young people aged 18-29, with an average of 23,452 lei. At the opposite end of the spectrum, pensioners benefit from the lowest average of fines, being 19,632 lei. Interestingly, people who hire a lawyer end up paying, on average, a higher amount (22,341 lei) than those who do not have a defence lawyer (20,189 lei), which may indicate that legal assistance is sought especially in cases with high financial stakes. The differences are also striking from a geographical point of view: while in Chişinău the average fine reaches a maximum threshold of 28,581 lei, in the Southern region it drops dramatically to only 7,698 lei, suggesting a much more lenient approach or different circumstances in cases in this area.

Figure 18. Average amount of final fine based on the demographic and socio-economic profile of the offender, MDL



Source: CPD calculations based on the court decisions dataset (4,205 cases, 2025)

SOCIAL DISPARITIES IN CRIMINAL SANCTIONS




2.1 ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL CASES

This chapter analyses criminal cases initiated under Article 181¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, which incriminates active voter corruption. The analysis is based exclusively on data provided by the General Police

Inspectorate (IGP) and covers a set of 77 criminal cases involving 105 individuals, relating to the period 1 September 2024 – 28 August 2025. The examination of these cases aims to outline the main characteristics of criminally investigated electoral corruption cases, including the profile of the persons involved, the territorial distribution of cases and the gender differences observable at the stage of criminal prosecution. The results presented should be interpreted with caution, given that the data set analysed reflects only the information available to the criminal prosecution authority. The IGP, as the authority responsible for establishing and investigating offences, does not have the competence or the necessary tools to systematically monitor the progress of each case during the trial phase and the final decisions handed down by the courts. Consequently, the analysed data does not allow for a full correlation between initiated criminal cases, any separations ordered by the court, and the sentences subsequently imposed. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that a single criminal case may involve several defendants and, in practice, cases may be separated during the trial phase, in which case separate judgments may be handed down for each person at different times and even by different courts. This procedural peculiarity affects the numerical relationship between cases, individuals and judicial decisions and limits the possibility of an exhaustive analysis of the final outcome of the criminal investigation. In addition, the relatively low number of criminal cases, compared to the scale of the offence, is determined by the high standard of proof specific to criminal liability, the institutional priorities of the investigating authorities and the latent nature of the offence. Consequently, the conclusions drawn describe trends and patterns observable in the criminal prosecution practice analysed, without being able to be extrapolated to the actual extent of active electoral corruption at the national level.

From a social profile perspective, the data shows that most individuals involved in criminal cases of electoral corruption are women, with a notable concentration among older age groups. Analysis of the criminal cases examined reveals a distinct gender profile of suspects and defendants in electoral corruption cases. Women account for 64% of all persons involved in these cases, while men account for 30.6%, indicating a disproportionate distribution by gender. In terms of age, the largest share is held by individuals aged 60 and above, representing 37.1% of the total, this fact suggesting a higher exposure of older persons to this type of practice, possibly in correlation with factors of social and economic vulnerability. At the same time, approximately one third of cases involve individuals aged up to 45, confirming that the phenomenon is not limited exclusively to a certain age group, rather affecting several categories of population.

Figure 19. Profile of persons involved in active electoral corruption, by gender and age, %




Source: Data processed by the CPD based on 77 criminal cases (2025)

Active electoral corruption is significantly more prevalent in rural areas, with marked differences by gender and region. An analysis of the background of individuals suspected and charged in criminal cases of electoral corruption shows that 71.4% of them come from rural areas, while less than a third reside in urban areas. However, a detailed analysis by gender reveals important differences. The general trend, according to which approximately two-thirds of those involved come from rural areas, is mainly determined by the profile of women, 77.5% of whom are residing in rural areas and only 21.1% in urban areas. In the case of men, the distribution is more balanced, with almost half residing in urban areas (41.1%) and the rest in rural areas (58.8%). From a regional perspective, active electoral corruption is mostly prevalent among people in the Northern region, which accounts for 50.5% of all cases analysed, followed by the Southern region (27.6%) and the Central region (21.9%). The same regional distribution is also found among women involved in criminal cases, where more than half come from the Northern region. In contrast, in case of men, the distribution by region is relatively homogeneous, with

approximately one third coming from each region. Thus, the data highlights a concentration of persons involved in active electoral corruption in rural areas and in the Northern region, a trend mainly determined by the high proportion of women in these areas, while in the case of men, a more balanced distribution is observed both between places of residence and between regions.


Figure 20. Profile of individuals involved in active electoral corruption, by gender, place of residence and region, %




Source: Data processed by the CPD based on 77 criminal cases (2025)

The territorial distribution of criminal cases indicates a higher concentration of electoral corruption in several specific rayons. Analysis by administrative-territorial units shows that the highest proportion of criminal cases of electoral corruption is associated with Edineț rayon, which accounts for 14.3% of all cases analysed. This is followed by Dondușeni rayon, with 8.6% of cases, as well as Ștefan Vodă, Soroca, Hîncești and Cahul rayons, each with a share of 7.6%. This distribution primarily reflects the location of the institutions responsible for investigating the cases, whether situated in the area where the acts occurred or corresponding to the residence of the individuals involved. A gender-differentiated analysis reveals that when men are involved, most cases are associated with Edineț rayon (17.6%), followed by Nisporeni rayon (14.7%). In case of women, higher percentages are also recorded in Edineț rayon (12.7%) and Soroca rayon (11.3%). Thus, data outline the existence of territorial concentrations of criminal cases of electoral corruption, which reflect rather the institutional distribution and geography of the investigated acts than the residential profile of the suspects or charged individuals, with visible differences depending on gender.

Figure 21. Distribution of criminal cases of active electoral corruption by gender and rayon, %






Source: Data processed by CPD based on 77 criminal cases (2025)

From an occupational status perspective, most individuals involved in criminal cases of electoral corruption are outside the labour market, suggesting that economic factors exert a stronger influence on participation in such acts than electoral preferences. An analysis of the occupational status of the individuals concerned indicates that approximately half of them is unemployed, highlighting a direct link between the lack of a stable source of income and involvement in electoral corruption. Retired individuals represent 27.6% of the total analysed, correlating with age data showing a predominance of persons aged 60 and above. This high proportion of pensioners indicates that, in addition to economic factors, experience and social networks may play a role in involvement in such practices. At the same time, almost a quarter of those involved in acts of active corruption are employed, which shows that the phenomenon is not limited exclusively to unemployed or retired individuals, but also affects certain categories of employees. Gender differences also highlight specific trends. Among men, 53% are unemployed, 23.5% are retired and 23.5% are employed, indicating a clear predominance of unemployed people. In case of women, 42.3% are unemployed, 29.6% are retired and 23.9% are employed, which shows that although unemployed women are the majority, the proportion of retired women is higher than that of men, reflecting the age distribution observed above. This gender-differentiated occupational structure may suggest that economic factors, access to income and social position influence involvement in electoral corruption differently for men and women. Thus, the data highlight that economic vulnerability and occupational status, particularly unemployment and retirement, are determining factors in involvement in electoral corruption, with significant differences between sexes and direct correlations with the age of those involved, with a greater emphasis on vulnerability among women.

Figure 22. Profile of individuals involved in active electoral corruption, by gender and occupational status, %




Source: Data processed by CPD based on 77 criminal cases (2025)

2.2 RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The analysis of the way evidence is handled reveals frequent absence of material evidence in criminal cases of electoral corruption. The examination of criminal files shows that almost in half of the cases (47.6%), the *corpus delicti* (material evidence) was not identified or was not attached to the case file, which raises questions about the ability of the judiciary to document electoral corruption. In cases where evidence was identified, the most common material evidence was technical or information data storage devices, which represented evidence in 21% of cases, followed by mobile phones (20%) and cash (18.1%). Electoral materials were identified less frequently, in 8.6% of cases, and documents or notes in 10.5% of cases. A gender-differentiated analysis indicates that in cases where the suspect or charged is a man, almost 60% of cases fails to contain corpus delicti, compared to 42.3% in case of women, evidence suggesting that there may be different patterns of investigation and documentation of facts, or that there may be gender differences in criminal behaviour. In this context, we note a high dependence on circumstantial evidence and limited use of traditional material evidence in the investigation of criminal cases of electoral corruption, which reflects both the particularities of the phenomenon and the constraints faced by the judiciary in providing effective evidence for such crimes.


Figure 23. Criminal groups, by type and gender, %



Source: Data processed by CPD based on 77 criminal cases (2025)

The application of procedural coercive measures in criminal cases of electoral corruption is relatively limited, regardless of the gender of the persons concerned. Analysis of the files examined reveals that in more than 60% of cases no procedural coercive measures were applied to suspects or charged. This trend is similar for women and men, with no significant differences from a gender perspective. Only about one-third of the individuals involved in criminal cases were subject to procedural coercive measures, while in two-thirds of cases these were not applied. The most frequently applied measure was the restriction on leaving the country or, where applicable, the locality. Measures involving deprivation of liberty were rarely applied, with less than 10% of suspects or charged being placed in custody, including house arrest. This finding indicates a low use of coercive measures in such cases, suggesting that judicial practice addresses electoral corruption primarily through non-custodial approaches.


Figure 24. Procedural coercive measures applied, by type and gender, %



Source: Data processed by CPD based on 77 criminal cases (2025)

Despite the limited use of procedural coercive measures and the vulnerable socio-economic profile of the individuals involved, access to legal assistance is high, predominantly through selected lawyers. An analysis of criminal cases shows that 76.2% of suspects and charged benefited from legal assistance through a lawyer of their choice, contracted and remunerated by them, with no significant differences in terms of gender. This situation is all the more relevant given that the data presented above indicate that most of the individuals involved are pensioners or unemployed. At the same time, approximately 9% of the individuals concerned were assisted by a court-appointed lawyer, and less than 3% did not receive legal assistance in criminal proceedings. The high level of access to defence through chosen lawyers, despite a predominantly vulnerable socio-economic profile, raises questions about how individuals with limited financial resources are able to secure such legal representation.


Figure 25. Access to legal assistance, by type and gender, %



Source: Data processed by CPD based on 77 criminal cases (2025)

The procedural status of criminal cases confirms a predominantly preliminary judicial response and limited completion of cases. The data indicates that the vast majority of criminal cases analysed are still under review by the competent authorities, representing 86.7% of the total. This proportion is higher for men (94.1%) than for women (83.1%), suggesting a lower degree of procedural progress in cases involving them. The share of cases resolved through discontinuation of criminal proceedings under Article 284 para.(2) sect.2) of the CPP is low and similar for both sexes (approximately 3%), this fact indicating that, in these cases, after reviewing the evidence, investigators concluded either that the alleged act did not occur, lacked criminal significance, or did not meet the elements required for criminal liability. Convictions represent a limited proportion of the total (6.7%), being identified exclusively in cases involving women (9.9%), while in the case of men they are absent. Similarly, dismissals and cases under examination on the merits account for a marginal proportion, less than 3%, with no significant differences. Overall, the distribution of procedural status indicates that the response of the judicial system in electoral corruption cases is predominantly characterised by early stages and a low rate of final resolution, which correlates with the limited use of coercive measures and the emphasis on procedural management of cases rather than their rapid completion.


Figure 26. Status of criminal cases, by type and gender, %



Source: Data processed by CPD based on 77 criminal cases (2025)

Most cases are still under review, either in court (42.9% of the total) or by the criminal investigation bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (37.1%). In terms of gender distribution, women are more likely to end up in court (46.5%) than men (35.3%), while men remain in greater proportion in police management or in the phase of referral for trial (14.7% for men compared to 9.9% for women). The referral of cases to CNA according to jurisdiction is relatively low (6.7% of the total), but the proportion of men (11.8%) is almost triple than that of women (4.2%), indicating a tendency for their cases to be referred to this authority more often. Final decisions, such as the dismissal of cases due to lack of evidence of a crime (1.9%), are rare and show no significant differences between the sexes. This distribution confirms that the response of the judicial system in electoral corruption cases focuses mainly on procedural management and preliminary examination of cases, and their completion with final decisions remains limited at this stage.


Figure 27. Stages of criminal cases, by type and gender, %



Source: Data processed by CPD based on 77 criminal cases (2025)

The response of the judicial system - analysed both in terms of the sentences handed down and the cases under examination - offers a clear, though numerically limited, picture. During the reporting period, only seven convictions were handed down. Of these, four were suspended prison sentences, two referred to fines, and in one case the sentence was not specified. All those sentenced to prison were women from rural areas in the Northern region of the country; two of them were unemployed and two were retired. In terms of age, two of the convicted individuals were under 45 and two were over 60. The low number of penalties imposed confirms once again that trials are difficult to conduct and that identifying and proving these offences is a difficult and timely process. Moreover, while suspended prison sentences do impose a penalty, they raise concerns about their effectiveness as a deterrent for the organizers at the top of electoral corruption networks.

Figure 28. Profile of individuals involved in active electoral corruption, by gender and occupational status, %



Source: Data processed by CPD based on 77 criminal cases (2025)

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the findings highlighted in the previous chapters – both for passive electoral corruption offences punishable by administrative sanctions and for criminal cases of active corruption – two major areas for intervention emerge. On the one hand, the analysis highlighted a number of institutional and procedural shortcomings: lack of interoperability between databases, absence of a unique case identifier, inconsistent depersonalisation of court decisions and difficulties in accessing disaggregated information have hampered both monitoring and the assessment of the consistency of sanctions. On the other hand, the socio-economic profiles of individuals involved show that electoral corruption disproportionately affects women, persons above 40 years old and those who are unemployed or retired, mainly from rural areas and certain regions.

Based on these findings, the recommendations chapter proposes a set of measures structured around two complementary dimensions.

- **IMPROVING INSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND ENSURING ACCESS TO DATA.** This approach aims to eliminate the fragmentation of information between the institutions responsible for identification, investigation and adjudication by creating a national interoperable system. The analysis highlighted that lack of a unique case identifier and inconsistent depersonalisation of court decisions hinder the traceability of files and collection of disaggregated data essential for gender analysis. It is proposed to standardise publication processes and ensure a continuous flow of information between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Anti-Corruption Centre and the courts in order to guarantee transparency and consistency in the process of sanctioning of electoral corruption.
- **REDUCING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES OF IDENTIFIED GROUPS.** This approach addresses structural causes that fuel corruption, focusing on removing barriers that exclude disadvantaged groups from the labour market. This study confirms that economic marginalisation, caused by age-based dismissal, discriminatory job advertisements or restricted access to education for young people with SEN, increases citizens' dependence on informal income and exposes them to vote buying. The recommendations aim to repeal discriminatory legal grounds, strengthen the role of the Equality Council in enforcing sanctions and expand social services, thus ensuring that citizens have the financial independence necessary to exercise their vote free from any constraints.

IMPROVING INSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND ENSURING ACCESS TO DATA

CREATING A NATIONAL INTEROPERABLE SYSTEM FOR THE UNIFIED TRACKING OF CASES OF VOTER CORRUPTION AND CONSOLIDATING THE INTERINSTITUTIONAL DATABASE IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE.

Currently, there is no single system that allows a complete tracking of an electoral corruption case from the initial complaint and investigation to the final decision. Voter corruption, both acts classified as administrative offence and crimes, is a worrying phenomenon, but the collection of data on these cases in the Republic of Moldova is currently fragmented and inconsistent. The information chain for tracking cases of voter corruption is fragmented not only between institutions, but also within the procedural stages. The information system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) allows the police to keep up-to-date records of cases until they are forwarded to the prosecutor's office. Subsequently, the prosecutor's office enters the relevant data into the same system shared with the MIA, which ensures a minimum of continuity. However, the chain is broken at the court stage, which uses a separate IT system that is not interconnected with that of the prosecution authorities, making it difficult to track the entire course of a

case, from reporting and investigation to referral to court and final resolution. In the absence of common identifiers or the possibility of automatic data correlation (e.g. by name or case ID), it becomes impossible to track the progress of a case after it has been sent to court.

Lack of disaggregated data and of a unique identifier limits the analysis of the phenomenon and informed public policies. Current systems do not allow for the consistent extraction of data based on criteria such as gender, age, location, occupational status or stage of proceedings, and the possibilities for analysis differ between institutions (especially in CNA cases and those pending before the courts). This limitation affects the ability of institutions to analyse the phenomenon of voter corruption in a systemic way and to build relevant profiles for both the individuals involved (perpetrators and victims) and the social and territorial context of the acts. A common data model, systematic collection of disaggregated indicators and the introduction of a unique case identifier, used throughout the proceedings, would allow for traceability in a unified flow, the identification of patterns (including gender-sensitive ones) and the development of more targeted prevention and intervention measures, in line with international standards on effective monitoring of crime.

Specific recommendation. The standardisation of data collection practices and the traceability of cases of electoral corruption can be improved through the following actions:

- **Creating an integrated (interoperable or single) information system for monitoring cases of voter corruption, connecting all relevant institutions.** The system should be used by the police (administrative offence cases), the CNA and the prosecutor's office (criminal cases) and the courts (resolution). It is essential that each case of voter corruption be recorded only once and tracked throughout its entire course, regardless of which institution takes over the case. Implementation can be achieved through a common platform or by interconnecting existing systems, based on a unique case identifier. In this way, the relevant data and documents — from the initial report or complaint to the indictment and final decision — will be accessible, within the limits of their powers, to the authorities involved. At the same time, a minimum set of data to be collected uniformly must be established and an interinstitutional protocol adopted to clarify responsibilities for transfer and updating, communication flows and mechanisms to prevent information 'loss' between procedural stages, ensuring full traceability of the case. This core data will enable both the operational management of the case and useful statistics. **The minimum set of data** proposed includes, at least: (i) *type of offence reported - legal classification*; (ii) *gender of the person involved - sex of the defendant/perpetrator (and possibly the victim, if applicable) in order to identify trends and the different impact of the phenomenon on gender groups*; (iii) *age – age of the person under investigation (relevant age ranges) at the time of the offence, in order to observe whether certain age groups are more involved in electoral corruption*. (iv) *living residence – as well as urban/rural residence, in order to highlight the geographical distribution of perpetrators*; (v) *place of action – specification of the administrative-territorial unit where the offence took place for the analysis of the administrative-geographical distribution*; (vi) *occupational status – the social/occupational status of the perpetrator (e.g. unemployed, public sector employee, private sector employee, pensioner, student, etc.), as a contextual element that can help to profile the electoral offender*; (vii) *current stage of proceedings – the stage at which the case is at any given time, marked by standardised stages. The system will automatically update the status as the case progresses or is resolved*; (viii) *outcome – indication of the outcome of the case (acquittal, sanction, application of custodial sentence with indication of the term)*.
- **Institutionalisation of a unified framework for reporting and managing data on voter corruption.** In order to overcome the current fragmentation of records and to ensure a complete and comparable picture of the phenomenon, it is recommended to establish a practice on periodic publishing of aggregated statistical reports on cases of electoral corruption, both administrative offences (Art. 47¹ of the Code on Administrative Offences) and criminal offences (Art. 181¹ CP), following the model of annual reports used in other areas (e.g. domestic violence and other types of crime). At the same time, it is necessary to systematically train the police, prosecution and court staff on the collection, entry, interpretation and correct use of data (including disaggregated data), given that these skills are recognised as a recurring shortcoming in international reports and other areas of public policy.

- **Formal establishment of an inter-institutional task force to enable joint action and real-time information exchange.** The task force will operate on a permanent basis (at least during the election year) and will have the following clear responsibilities: (i) exchange of operational data between institutions on possible *vote-buying* networks; (ii) conducting undercover operations and technical surveillance in high-risk communities (e.g. rural areas known for previous incidents); (iii) centralising and quickly verifying reports of electoral corruption, with the possibility of immediate intervention by the police or the CNA; (iv) *ex officio* actions in cases of solid evidence (e.g. individuals caught with large sums of money and lists of voters); (v) making proposals to CEC for sanctioning electoral competitors (public warnings, referral to the courts) when their direct involvement is established; (vi) collecting disaggregated data in a single interoperable system for real-time monitoring and analysis.

CONSOLIDATING TOOLS AND PROFESSIONALS TO ENSURE UNIFORM DE-IDENTIFICATION OF DECISIONS AND CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF PROTECTION AND TRANSPARENCY STANDARDS

The application of decision de-identification is inconsistent, oscillating between exposing sensitive data and excessively concealing information of public interest. Following an analysis of 4,300 decisions rendered by the courts of first instance in cases of passive electoral corruption, it has been found that de-identification of data is applied **inconsistently**, and this fact generates both risks of privacy violations and transparency issues. Two opposing deviations were observed: some decisions leave such sensitive identification data as IDNP, age, name, age and place of residence visible, while others are excessively de-identified, to the point of concealing information that should remain public for the proper understanding and public control of the act of justice, such as the location of the court or the rayon of the police inspectorate. This variation simultaneously creates (i) real risks to privacy and (ii) decisions that are "unusable" for comparison and analysis, as they lack the minimum benchmarks allowing the understanding and verification of the uniformity of practice.

The inconsistency persists given the fact that automatic anonymisation in PIGD does not distinguish context, and mandatory verification is not applied consistently, resulting in incorrect masking and incomplete de-identification. The problem is not a lack of rules, but the inconsistent application of existing ones. According to section 20 of the "Regulation on the publication of court decisions on the national court portal and on the website of the Supreme Court of Justice", approved by Decision No. 658/30 of 10 October 2017, de-identification of judgments published online must be achieved by mandatory concealment of certain categories of personal data (e.g. place and date of birth, domicile/residence, telephone number, personal code/IDNP, health data, bank details, vehicle registration number, personal health insurance code and personal social security code, as well as other data provided for by law). At the same time, section 21 expressly provides that the names of the parties, information about the court/judicial panel and about professional participants such as the clerk, prosecutor, investigating officer, mediator, bailiff, notary and lawyer, as well as the names of legal entities cannot be anonymised. One of the main causes of the problem relies on the fact that automatic anonymisation in PIGD sometimes masks information incorrectly since it cannot distinguish the context, and corrective verification by assistants/judges is not applied consistently, although the SCM Regulation provides for the obligation to verify the result of automatic anonymisation and correct the emerging errors to ensure full compliance, the findings show that this verification is not carried out consistently, which allows both erroneous masking and partial de-identification in court decisions.

At the European level, standards of good practice are explicitly formulated by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) of the Council of Europe in its document adopted on 18 November 2024: "Guidelines for online publication of court decisions, with a view to enhancing legal knowledge". In particular, Guideline No. 12 on anonymisation and pseudonymisation, which provides that the rules on anonymisation/pseudonymisation for judgments published online must be applied in such a way as to effectively protect the privacy and security of individuals, while maintaining transparency and access to information of public interest; emphasises the need to minimise the risk of re-identification, with particular attention to sensitive data and vulnerable persons, and to ensure a balance between data protection and the need to understand the decision, including through review mechanisms where necessary.

Specific recommendations: Current shortcomings in the uneven application of the Regulation, errors generated by automatic anonymisation and inconsistent human control can be corrected through a package of complementary institutional interventions focused on standardisation, capacity and quality control:

- **Operational standardisation through mandatory guide or checklist.** The CSM and ADJAJ should establish a mandatory practical tool that would transpose the Regulation into clear steps and exhaustively list the categories of data to be de-identified, while preventing excessive de-identification that affects the transparency and usability of decisions.
- **Professional capacity through continuous training with practical examples for responsible staff:** The SCM and the National Institute of Justice should organise regular training for judges, judicial assistants and court clerks, focusing on typical errors and "contextual" situations in which automatic anonymisation may incorrectly mask information, reinforcing the obligation of human verification prior to publication.
- **Technical optimisation of PIGD:** Improve anonymisation functionalities to reduce repetitive errors, without treating automation as a sufficient solution in itself, and its result shall be validated before publication to avoid partial de-identification and erroneous masking.
- **Systemic control through permanent compliance monitoring:** Establishment of a permanent mechanism to monitor de-identification that will track unjustified exposures of data that "should always be hidden", excessive de-identification and inconsistent de-identification, with feedback and corrective measures targeted for court's needs.

THE NEED TO STANDARDISE JUDICIAL PRACTICE IN CASES OF PASSIVE ELECTORAL CORRUPTION

Analysis of judgments in cases of passive electoral corruption reveals inconsistent solutions that affect procedural guarantees. Examination of 4,300 administrative offence decisions led to the conclusion that in numerous cases that were identical *de facto* and *de jure*, based on the same evidence and the same legal classification (Article 47¹ of the Code of Administrative Offences), the courts have widely adopted diametrically opposed solutions, which indicates inconsistency in the application and interpretation of the legal framework. This formalism is reflected in similarly worded solutions regardless of the outcome, although there are variations between courts in terms of the rate of admission of appeals, suggesting a lack of uniform practice. In addition, in many cases, sanctions are based on evidence taken from parallel criminal cases (e.g. lists of text messages, notifications regarding the transfer), without their direct administration and verification in the administrative offence procedure, and the legality of the transfer of evidence is rarely examined. Overall, these shortcomings hinder procedural guarantees, the standard of proof and the presumption of innocence, as well as comparability of case law at national level.

Contradictory rulings in identical cases undermine legal predictability and necessitate intervention by the Supreme Court of Justice to ensure consistency, particularly in light of the forthcoming consecutive election cycle. The adoption of diametrically opposed solutions in cases that are identical in form and content indicates the existence of inconsistent case law or divergence in case law. However, the existence of diametrically opposed court decisions rendered by national courts on identical issues of fact and law is contrary to this principle (ECHR, *Păduraru v. Romania*, 2006, para. 92), which reduces public confidence in justice (ECHR, *Vinčić et al. v. Serbia and Montenegro*, 2006, para. 56). On the other hand, good practices show that prompt intervention by higher courts can solve these problems. Good examples come from the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) of the Republic of Moldova, which has positive precedents in unifying case law by adopting Recommendations for the uniform interpretation of problematic legal provisions, thus contributing to the harmonisation of solutions and improving the quality of the reasoning of decisions handed down by lower courts. This recommendation is all the more relevant given that a period of approximately three years of consecutive elections is coming up, during which the risk of large-scale electoral corruption cannot be ruled out. Therefore, standardising the judicial practice is essential to

prevent occurrence of the same inconsistent approaches and ensure a coherent and predictable judicial response in future electoral cycles.

Specific recommendation: it is recommended that the Supreme Court of Justice issues a *direct recommendation* (or an explanatory decision of the Plenary) on the uniform application of Article 47¹ of the Code of Administrative Offences applicable throughout the country. This intervention should provide clear guidance to the courts on the administration of evidence and individualised reasoning for each decision in administrative offence cases. SCJ should use the tools at its disposal to *unify judicial practice* in the area of voter corruption in order to comply with ECHR standards and ensure fairness of administrative offence proceedings.

REDUCING SOCIO-ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES OF IDENTIFIED GROUPS

ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MECHANISM FOR SANCTIONING DISCRIMINATORY JOB ADVERTISEMENTS

The report highlights an overlap between people who are rejected by the labour market through discriminatory advertisements and those most exposed to passive electoral corruption. People of pre-retirement and retirement age who face stereotypes about being "too old" for employment are rejected from the outset by job advertisements that impose age limits or gender preferences and, as a result, remain without an active income. The CPD report on electoral corruption shows that a significant proportion of those punished for passive electoral corruption fall into this category, often elderly and unemployed individuals. In other words, these are the groups systematically excluded from the labour market by arbitrarily imposing criteria of age and gender that end up being the most vulnerable to vote buying because they lack a stable income and depend on occasional assistance. Discrimination in employment thus becomes not only a violation of equal opportunities, but also a structural factor that directly contributes to *the exclusion of vulnerable groups from the labour market* and fuels precariousness, increasing the risk that these people will be drawn into electoral corruption networks.

The current mechanism for sanctioning discriminatory job advertisements, through fragmented and lengthy procedures, reduces the effectiveness of anti-discrimination rules and fails to comply with European requirements for firm and dissuasive sanctions. Throughout 10 months of 2025, the Equality Council received 40 complaints about discriminatory advertisements and issued 13 decisions in such cases. The cases concerned advertisements that unjustly restricted access on the basis of gender ("women only", "position reserved for men"), age ("up to 35 years old") or other protected criteria. Although the Code of Administrative Offences explicitly prohibits such wording in Article 54² para. (1) letter a), the sanctioning mechanism is fragmented: the Council examines the complaint, finds out that discrimination took place and draws up a report that is sent to the court for the application of the sanction. This mechanism, on the one hand, reduces the effectiveness of the response through a cumbersome and lengthy procedure, which is discouraging for the victim and provides the employers with more time and space to prevent the enforcement of the decision or to repeat the same practice; while, on the other hand, it further burdens the judicial system with cases that could be examined by other institutions, given that the courts are already facing a high volume of cases and a shortage of judges. At the same time, this model contradicts European standards. A system where the Council merely issues findings while sanctions rely on a separate, slow judicial process risks reducing penalties to symbolic gestures rather than effective deterrents.

In Romania, the National Council for Combating Discrimination (CNCD) not only investigates and finds facts of discrimination, but also imposes fines itself through enforceable administrative decisions, which can subsequently be challenged in court. In Bulgaria, the Commission for Protection against Discrimination (CPD), created under the Protection against Discrimination Act, has a similar structure and mandate: the law expressly provides that it finds violations and imposes the sanctions and administrative measures provided for in the normative act, including fines, with the Commission's decisions being directly punitive and subject to judicial review afterwards, not beforehand.

Specific recommendation: It is proposed to supplement Article 423⁵ para. (1¹) of the Code on Administrative Offences with the indication 54² para. (1) letter a), in the sense of assigning to the Equality Council the competence to establish and examine administrative offences in cases of discriminatory advertisements.

RETAINING PENSIONERS AS WORKFORCE BY REPEALING DISCRIMINATORY GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL

The current Labour Code provision enforces an age-based dismissal mechanism that disproportionately impacts women and disregards employees' actual working capacity. The provision of Article 86 para.(1) section (y¹) of the Labour Code, "the employee's status as a pensioner due to reaching retirement age," establishes the general basis allowing the employer to unilaterally terminate the employment relationship based on the age-related criterion, without the obligation to conduct an individual assessment of performance, qualifications or work capacity. This legal provision was introduced by Law No. 188/2017 and has had discriminatory effects, including the fact that retirement age for women and men is not the same, which exposes women to dismissal earlier than men in comparable situations, in a situation where there is still a difference in retirement age (according to [the National Social Insurance Agency](#), on 1 July 2025 the age for women will be 61 years and 6 months, while for men it will remain 63 years, with a full contribution period of 34 years for both sexes). This time difference amplifies the risk of disproportionate application of section y¹) against women and is contrary to the commitments made by the Republic of Moldova to bring its legislation closer to EU standards (Directive 2006/54/EC and Directive 2000/78/EC), as well as the case law of the CJEU, which has classified dismissal based exclusively on reaching different retirement ages for women and men as discrimination on grounds of sex.

The claim of generational competition lacks support from actual labour market conditions and enforcing section y¹) imposes a significant economic burden on pensioners. The frequently invoked argument that keeping pensioners in work would jeopardise the employment of young professionals is not supported by the current realities of the labour market, with ANOFM and BNS regularly reporting tens of thousands of vacancies in both public and private sectors. [The World Bank study](#) shows that the thesis according to which keeping pensioners in the labour market would reduce opportunities for young people is based on an erroneous assumption, and that the employment of workers aged 55–64 tends to be associated with higher, rather than lower youth employment, suggesting complementarity (experience/mentoring vs. new skills) rather than substitution; at the same time evidence does not support a crowding-out effect on young people. Remaining in work is a vital economic necessity, as the minimum pension barely reaches the subsistence level, and the major income gaps between urban and rural areas make wages an indispensable source of protection against poverty.

Austria has adopted measures to encourage older people to remain in and return to the labour market by eliminating age discrimination. Since 2018, the government programme "[Beschäftigungsinitiative 50+](#)" has been in place allocating €165 million annually to integrate workers aged 50+ into the labour market, combining wage subsidies and incentives for employers who hire unemployed people over the age of 50. At the same time, Austria offers free IT training for seniors, helping them adapt to the digital market. In [the United Kingdom](#), the elimination of the "default retirement age" has reinforced the ban on compulsory retirement, allowing older people to remain in the workforce as long as they are able and willing, reducing discrimination and supporting a flexible transition to retirement.

Specific recommendation: It is proposed to repeal Article 86 para. (1) section y¹) of the Labour Code ("the employee's status as a pensioner due to reaching retirement age"), moving from an age-based model of termination of employment to a model based on performance and individual assessment.

ADOPTION OF MEASURES TO PROMOTE AND SUPPORT THE EMPLOYMENT OF INDIVIDUALS FROM VULNERABLE GROUPS.

The findings of the study on electoral corruption confirm that economic precariousness translates into exploitable social vulnerabilities. The analysed data set shows that approximately 57.5% of people are lacking declared employment and 28.3% are pensioners, with women being overrepresented in the category of sanctioned pensioners, which indicates a risk profile associated with economic insecurity and dependence on low incomes. In particular, people without stable incomes, the unemployed, pensioners and young people without jobs are frequent targets of vote-buying schemes, confirming a direct link between poverty/economic insecurity and the willingness to accept benefits in exchange for votes.

This reality is part of a broader context of inequality and economic exclusion. The CPD study "Unequal Moldova" from 2025 shows that in 2024, almost one third of the population lived in absolute poverty and 15% in extreme poverty, with marked disparities in rural areas. At the same time, income inequality is high, with the richest population earning on average about six times more than the poorest. For the poorest households, income structure shows a pronounced dependence on social benefits (36.3%) and remittances (11.4%) to the detriment of stable wage income, which indicates insufficient integration into the formal labour market and maintains economic vulnerability. Therefore, supporting the employment of vulnerable groups, long-term unemployed individuals, people with disabilities, large families, NEETs and marginalised communities is not only a social measure, rather a structural intervention to reduce the risks fuelling survival behaviours and informal dependencies. Essentially, exclusion from the labour market and the lack of a decent income create the proper conditions for electoral exploitation of these people.

Germany applies wage subsidy schemes for employers who hire people from vulnerable groups (the long-term unemployed, older workers close to retirement, people with disabilities, etc.). The German state offers employers monthly subsidies of up to 50% of the total wage cost (including related social security contributions) for up to 12 months when they hire hard-to-employ unemployed people. France has developed the "Garantie Jeunes" programme, launched in 2013 and implemented through local youth employment agency networks. This programme offers young people aged 16-25 who are NEET an intensive one-year course combining personalised counselling, group workshops and work placements in companies, following the "work first" principle to provide them with direct professional experience. During the programme, young people also receive monthly financial support (approx. €470) as an integration income, conditional on active participation in training and job search activities.

Specific recommendations: In order to reduce economic precariousness that fuels electoral corruption and to integrate vulnerable people into the labour market, a comprehensive package of measures is needed at national level. The following measures are proposed:

- **Increasing the budget and expanding the vocational training programmes offered by ANOFM by:** (i) expanding the list of vocational training providers contracted by ANOFM to include non-formal education providers that can offer courses in emerging fields such as information technology, renewable energy, cyber security, biotechnology and genetics, health care services, etc.; (ii) expanding the list of specialisations offered for training, focusing on professions with growth potential that are attractive to young people; (iii) developing flexible training programmes that suit the diverse needs and life situations of NEETs, including programmes with adapted schedules, online or hybrid modules and updated content; (iv) including in training programmes modules for educational support (tutorials, remedial classes, exam preparation courses), life skills development (budget management, decision-making) and support for civic and community involvement, encouraging young people to get involved in the community and become responsible adults; (v) negotiating with education providers to offer flexible, accessible study programmes for groups such as parents with young children;
- **extending financial support to employers for adapting workplaces for people with disabilities by increasing the amount of the subsidy**, extending the subsidy period for support staff from 12 to 24

months and revising the ceiling of 10 average monthly salaries per economy for each job created or adapted;

- **in the first 6 months of employment, young people who have been NEETs should be exempt from paying income tax**, which would facilitate their integration into the labour market and reduce economic barriers;
- **granting tax incentives to entrepreneurs who hire Roma people, members of large families and people without means of subsistence**, such as income tax reductions or partial exemptions from social security contributions, in order to promote social and economic inclusion of these vulnerable groups;
- **exempting employers from paying compulsory social contributions for at least one year when they hire persons with disabilities**, as well as exempting employees with disabilities from paying these contributions during the same period, in order to reduce the costs of hiring and stimulate their integration into the labour market;
- **increasing subsidies for the employment of unemployed individuals and persons with disabilities.**

STRENGTHENING CIVIC EDUCATION ON DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, THE VALUE OF VOTING AND VOTERS' RESILIENCE TO ELECTORAL CORRUPTION

The low level of civic education regarding democratic processes, importance of voting, and the role of each citizen in strengthening the rule of law directly contributes to the perpetuation of electoral corruption. Lack of a clear understanding of the value of voting and the implications of participating or not participating in elections encourages transactional behaviour, undermines the essence of representativeness and leads to the perpetuation of political elites elected on illegitimate criteria. According to data collected between September 2024 and August 2025, over 25,822 cases of passive electoral corruption were documented, equivalent to about 1.1% of the country's population. Beyond the numerical dimension, analysis of the profile of offenders indicates the involvement of young people, especially in the municipality of Chişinău, where approximately 22.7% of those sanctioned were under 30 years old, suggesting silent but active participation in electoral corruption schemes, either as intermediaries or as bought voters. These findings reflect a profound deficiency in the civic education of citizens, many of whom are unaware that accepting material benefits in exchange for their vote directly compromises their own representation, affects the quality of governance and weakens democracy. Intervention is all the more necessary given that political culture remains weak and mechanisms for democratic socialisation are limited, especially among disadvantaged groups. In order to correct these systemic dysfunctions, it is imperative to develop extensive civic education that combines theoretical content on rights, elections and civic responsibility with applied methods, simulations, debates and local initiatives tailored to each group: in schools, colleges and universities for young people; in communities or through NGOs, for older people and adults. In this way, local and central authorities, in partnership with civil society, could run accessible workshops and information sessions, including in rural areas, focusing on the real consequences of corrupt voting and the importance of informed participation. Only through such interactive, inclusive civic education, structured around the real needs of the population, will the Republic of Moldova be able to increase its resilience to electoral corruption and lay the foundations for genuine citizen participation.

***In Finland**, students are involved in parliamentary simulations and Youth Parliament projects, where young people participate in simulated plenary sessions and political debates, developing their civic skills through direct experience. **Germany** places particular emphasis on civic education both in schools, where "Political Education" is a compulsory subject in all federal states, and outside them. The Federal Agency for Civic Education develops resources and workshops for adult citizens, promoting informed participation in the democratic process. There are programmes aimed at involving disadvantaged groups in civic life, such as voting workshops for senior citizens or civic integration courses for migrants, designed to explain electoral procedures, the importance of voting and combating misinformation, ensuring that all citizens (regardless of age or origin) can exercise their rights in an informed manner.*

Specific recommendation: Establish a national civic education package on democratic processes and the value of voting, built on two complementary levels: (i) **formal education** – revise the civic education curriculum (middle school/high school) to include a compulsory subject on electoral integrity with applied methods: election simulations, public debates, community projects and (ii) **non-formal adult learning** – community modules with content adapted to different categories of adults and young people, using digital channels and electoral literacy. Implementation should be coordinated inter-institutionally by the Ministry of Education, CEC/CICDE, LPA/NGOs, with a measurable objective: to increase understanding of the role of voting and reduce social tolerance of electoral corruption among categories where the study indicates high exposure.

EXPANDING PERSONAL SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK.

Insufficient coverage of personal assistance services increases vulnerability of persons with severe disabilities and shifts the burden of care onto women, with negative effects on their participation in the labour market. People with severe disabilities in the Republic of Moldova face major social and economic vulnerabilities, and the social service "Personal Assistance" is a pressing necessity for their integration and well-being. According to recent data, approximately 160,000 individuals with disabilities (about 6.7% of the population) live in the Republic of Moldova, of whom over 16% have severe disabilities. However, access to personal assistance services remains limited – in 2022, only 7,239 people benefited from this service, a figure well below the actual need for the more than 26,000 people with severe disabilities in the country, indicating low coverage due to insufficient resources. The lack of institutionalised assistance shifts the burden of care onto the family, especially women. Currently, care responsibilities in the family fall mainly on women, many of whom are forced to give up their jobs in order to take care of their children or relatives with disabilities. The result is increased vulnerability both for persons with disabilities who are isolated at home and for women who care for them, who are often left without their own income and without access to the labour market. The analysis showed that a significant majority of those punished for involvement in electoral corruption did not have a job, were either unemployed or retired, with women being overrepresented among the retired. This profile highlights that professional inactivity and lack of a stable income are factors directly correlated with economic vulnerability and a predisposition to accept small undue benefits. In other words, exclusion from the labour market, often caused by care responsibilities, contributes to the marginalisation of vulnerable groups and their dependence on occasional aid. Without adequate support from the state, families caring for persons with disabilities remain in a cycle of poverty and dependency, which justifies the expansion of public interventions under the national legal framework to protect these groups.

In Sweden, persons with severe disabilities are legally entitled to personal assistance, which is financed through a combination of local authorities covering assistance up to a certain threshold of hours per week and, if the need exceeds this level, the state budget (through the National Social Insurance Agency) providing a personal assistance allowance to cover the costs. This approach also complies with Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which obliges states to ensure access to community support services, including personal assistance, to enable independent living and prevent isolation.

Specific recommendation: Significantly expand personal assistance services nationwide, in accordance with the existing legal framework, by increasing the budget allocated to this service so that the needs of persons with severe disabilities are met to a much greater extent than at present. Implementing this proposal will have a positive and broad impact on social, economic and gender inclusion in the Republic of Moldova.

ANNEX 1. RESULTS OF ECONOMETRIC REGRESSIONS

Table A 1. Logistic model. Dependent variable: with/without a lawyer

term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value	conf.low	conf.high
(Intercept)	1.470	0.438	0.881	0.378	0.621	3,496
male	0.828	0.070	-2.680	0.007	0.721	0.951
age	1.004	0.003	1.255	0.209	0.998	1.010
urban residence	1.294	0.074	3,461	0.001	1,119	1,498
employee	1,468	0.401	0.957	0.339	0.663	3,246
unemployed	1,608	0.396	1,200	0.230	0.734	3,517
retired	1,205	0.412	0.453	0.651	0.534	2,722
Chisinau region	0.109	0.191	-11,634	0.000	0.075	0.158
Northern region	0.892	0.111	-1.030	0.303	0.715	1.107
Southern region	0.242	0.132	-10.764	0.000	0.186	0.312
UTAG region	0.109	0.353	-6.268	0.000	0.052	0.211
fine imposed	1,000	0	-0.276	0.782	0.999	1.001

Table A 2. Linear regression model. Dependent variable: log (fine imposed)

term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value
(Intercept)	6.1579	0.0365	168.6517	0.0000
male	-0.0155	0.0059	-2.6057	0.0092
age	0.0006	0.0002	2.3413	0.0193
urban residence	0.0724	0.0061	11.7969	0.0000
employee	-0.0017	0.0356	-0.0489	0.9610
unemployed	0.0095	0.0352	0.2696	0.7875
retired	-0.0375	0.0364	-1.0290	0.3036
Chisinau region	0.1898	0.0152	12.4815	0.0000
Northern region	0.2052	0.0087	23.5790	0.000
Southern region	0.0198	0.0113	1.7529	0.0797
UTAG region	0.0242	0.0265	0.9151	0.3602

Table A1 . Multinomial model. Dependent variable: court decision regarding administrative fine

fine	term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value
maintained	(Intercept)	4.0105	0.1532	9.0680	0.0000
maintained	male	0.8861	0.0802	-1.5077	0.1316
maintained	urban residence	0.7673	0.0844	-3.1388	0.0017
maintained	without lawyer	1.0276	0.0852	0.3199	0.7490
maintained	fine imposed	1.0005	0.0004	1.3155	0.1883
maintained	employed	0.6162	0.0993	-4.8754	0.0000
maintained	unemployed	0.4183	0.0778	-11.2008	0.0000
maintained	retired	0.4878	0.0864	-8.3096	0.0000
maintained	Chisinau region	1.9449	0.1999	3.3280	0.0009
maintained	Northern region	2.0060	0.1132	6.1486	0.0000
maintained	Southern Region	0.1849	0.1373	-12.2916	0.0000
maintained	UTAG region	0.5037	0.2941	-2.3319	0.0197
decreased	(Intercept)	0.0000	0.0024	-15002.9915	0.00
decreased	male	0.9302	0.1632	-0.4432	0.6576

decreased	urban residence	0.4229	0.1727	-4.9843	0.0000
decreased	without lawyer	1.8885	0.1618	3.9306	0.0001
decreased	fine imposed	1.0237	0.0002	117.4047	0.0000
decreased	employed	369948265.5404	0.1323	149.0777	0.0000
decreased	unemployed	98121637.9063	0.1140	161.4770	0.0000
decreased	retired	224700981.5881	0.1340	143.5602	0.00
decreased	Chisinau region	0.00	0.000	-12921971206813.3000	0.00
decreased	Northern region	0.5301	0.0167	-37.9634	0.0000
decreased	Southern region	0.0246	0.0027	-1354.8241	0.0000
decreased	UTAG region	0.0001	0.0000	-43533702.2754	0.0000

ABOUT THE CENTRE PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT

Established in 1998, *the Centre Partnership for Development (CPD)* is a public institution that aims to contribute to the promotion of an inclusive discourse on gender issues, the status of women and equal opportunities for women and men. The CPD is a non-governmental organisation that advocates for the implementation of the concept of gender equality in all areas of life, the promotion of public policies in this field, addressing issues related to the role of women in society and their empowerment, and the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. It also serves as a centre for documentation, information and training centre for relevant NGOs and initiative groups.

Purpose. To develop and strengthen resources and mechanisms for the equitable empowerment of women and men in order to promote gender equality in the Republic of Moldova by supporting a coherent approach to influencing policies.

Mission. CPD promotes the values of gender equality as part of an open society, with the aim of strengthening a genuine gender partnership.

Vision. CPD advocates for the building of a community with equal prospects and opportunities for its members, a society in which women and men are full citizens, able to solve problems together, benefit equally from new opportunities and engage fully in political, economic and social activities.

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